Excerpt from Lyles, et. al., Civil Liberties and the Constitution: Cases and Commentaries, 9th edition, 2011
Adderly v. State of Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966)
Justice Black delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioners, Harriett Louise Adderly and 31 other persons, were convicted by a jury in a joint trial on a charge of “trespass with a malicious and mischievous intent” upon the premises of the county jail contrary to section 821.18 of the Florida statutes set out below.* Petitioners, apparently all students of the Florida A. & M. University in Tallahassee, had gone from the school to the jail about a mile away, along with many other students, to “demonstrate” at the jail their protests because of arrests of other protesting students the day before, and perhaps to protest more generally against state and local policies and practices of racial segregation, including segregation of the jail. The county sheriff, legal custodian of the jail and jail grounds, tried to persuade the students to leave the jail grounds. When this did not work, he notified them that they must leave or he would arrest them for trespassing, and notified them further that if they resisted arrest he would arrest them for resisting arrest as well. Some of the students left, but others, including petitioners, remained and they were arrested. On appeal the convictions were affirmed by the Florida [appellate courts]. [P]etitioners applied to us for certiorari contending that, in view of petitioners’ purpose to protest against jail and other segregation policies, their conviction denied them “rights of free speech, assembly, petition, due process of law and equal protection of the laws as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Petitioners have insisted from the beginning of these cases that they are controlled and must be reversed because of our prior cases of Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963), and Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965). We cannot agree.
The Edwards case, like this one, did come up when a number of persons demonstrated on public property against their State’s segregation policies. They also sang hymns and danced, as did the demonstrators in this case. But here the analogies to this case end. In Edwards, the demonstrators went to the South Carolina State Capitol grounds to protest. In this case they went to the jail. Traditionally, state capitol grounds are open to the public. Jails, built for security purposes, are not. The demonstrators at the South Carolina Capitol went in through a public driveway, and as they entered they were told by state officials there that they had a right as citizens to go through the State House grounds as long as they were peaceful. Here the demonstrators entered the jail grounds through a driveway used only for jail purposes and without warning to or permission from the sheriff. More importantly, South Carolina sought to prosecute its State Capitol demonstrators by charging them with the common-law crime of breach of the peace. This Court in Edwards took pains to point out at length the indefinite, loose, and broad nature of this charge. The South Carolina breach-of-the-peace statute was thus struck down as being so broad and all-embracing as to jeopardize speech, press, assembly and petition.
The Florida trespass statute under which these petitioners were charged cannot be challenged on this ground. It is aimed at conduct of one limited kind, that is for one person or persons to trespass upon the property of another with a malicious and mischievous intent. There is no lack of notice in this law, nothing to entrap or fool the unwary.
Petitioners seem to argue that the Florida trespass law is void for vagueness because it requires a trespass to be “with a malicious and mischievous intent.” But these words do not broaden the scope of trespass so as to make it cover a multitude of types of conduct as does the common-law breach-of-the-peace charge. On the contrary, these words narrow the scope of the offense. The trial court charged the jury as to their meaning, and petitioners have not argued that this definition, set out below,** is not a reasonable and clear definition of the terms. The use of these terms in the statute, instead of contributing to uncertainty and misunderstanding, actually makes its meaning more understandable and clear.
Petitioners next argue that “petty criminal statutes may not be used to violate minorities’ constitutional rights.” This of course is true, but this abstract proposition gets us nowhere in deciding the case.
In summary both these statements show testimony ample to prove this: Disturbed and upset by the arrest of their schoolmates the day before, a large number of Florida A. & M. students assembled on the school grounds and decided to march down to the county jail. Some apparently wanted to get themselves put in jail too, along with the students already there. A group of around 200 marched from the school and arrived at the jail singing and clapping. They went directly to the jail door entrance where they were met by a deputy sheriff, evidently surprised by their arrival. He asked them to move back, claiming they were blocking the entrance to the jail and fearing that they might attempt to enter the jail. They moved back part of the way, where they stood or sat, singing, clapping and dancing, on the jail driveway and on an adjacent grassy area upon the jail premises. This particular jail entrance and driveway were not normally used by the public, but the sheriff’s department for transporting prisoners to and from the courts several blocks away and by commercial concerns for servicing the jail. Even after their partial retreat, the demonstrators continued to block vehicular passage over this driveway up to the entrance of the jail. Someone called the sheriff who was at the moment apparently conferring with one of the state court judges about incidents connected with prior arrests for demonstrations. When the sheriff returned to the jail, he immediately inquired if all was safe inside the jail and was told it was. He then engaged in a conversation with two of the leaders. He told them that they were trespassing upon jail property and that he would give them 10 minutes to leave or he would arrest them. Neither of the leaders did anything to disperse the crowd, and one of them told the sheriff that they wanted to get arrested. A local minister talked with some of the demonstrators and told them not to enter the jail, because they could not arrest themselves, but just to remain where they were. After about 10 minutes, the sheriff, in a voice loud enough to be heard by all, told the demonstrators that he was the legal custodian of the jail and its premises, that they were trespassing on county property in violation of the law, that they should all leave forthwith or he would arrest them, and that if they attempted to resist arrest, he would charge them with that as a separate offense. Some of the group left. Others, including all petitioners, did not leave. Some of them sat down. In a few minutes, realizing that the remaining demonstrators had no intention of leaving, the sheriff ordered his deputies to surround those remaining on jail premises and placed them, 107 demonstrators, under arrest. The sheriff unequivocally testified that he did not arrest any person other than those who were on the jail premises. Of the three petitioners testifying, two insisted that they were arrested before they had a chance to leave, had they wanted to, and one testified that she did not intend to leave. The sheriff again explicitly testified that he did not arrest any person who was attempting to leave.
[T]he jury was authorized to find that the State had proven every essential element of the crime, as it was defined by the state court. That interpretation is, of course, binding on us, leaving only the question of whether conviction of the state offense, thus defined, unconstitutionally deprives petitioners of their rights to freedom of speech, press, assembly, or petition. We hold it does not. The sheriff, as jail custodian, had power as the state courts have here held, to direct that this large crowd of people get off the grounds. There is not a shred of evidence in this record that this power was exercised, or that its exercise was sanctioned by the lower courts, because the sheriff objected to what was being sung or said by the demonstrators or because he disagreed with the objectives of their protest. The record reveals that he objected only to their presence on that part of the jail grounds reserved for jail uses. There is no evidence at all that on any other occasion had similarly large groups of the public been permitted to gather on this portion of the jail grounds for any purpose. Nothing in the Constitution of the United States prevents Florida from even-handed enforcement of its general trespass statute against those refusing to obey the sheriff’s order to remove themselves from what amounted to the curtailage of the jailhouse. The State, no less than a private owner of property, has power to preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated. For this reason there is no merit to the petitioners’ argument that they had a constitutional right to stay on the property, over the jail custodian’s objections, because this “area chosen for the peaceful civil rights demonstration was not only ‘reasonable’ but also particularly appropriate.” Such an argument has as its major unarticulated premise the assumption that people who want to propagandize protests or views have a constitutional right to do so whenever and however and wherever they please. We reject [that concept]. [T]he United States Constitution does not forbid a State to control the use of its own property for its own lawful nondiscriminatory purpose.
These judgments are affirmed.
Justice Douglas, joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justices Brennan and Fortas, dissenting:
With all respect, the Court errs in treating the case as if it were an ordinary trespass case or an ordinary picketing case.
The jailhouse, like an executive mansion, a legislative chamber, a courthouse, or the statehouse itself is one of the seats of government, whether it be the Tower of London, the Bastille, or a small county jail. And when it houses political prisoners or those whom many think are unjustly held, it is an obvious center for protest. The right to petition for the redress of grievances has an ancient history and is not limited to writing a letter or sending a telegram to a congressman; it is not confined to appearing before the local city council, or writing letters to the President or Governor or Mayor. Conventional methods of petitioning may be, and often have been, shut off to large groups of our citizens. Legislators may turn deaf ears; formal complaints may be routed endlessly through a bureaucratic maze; courts may let the wheels of justice grind very slowly. Those who do not control television and radio, those who cannot afford to advertise in newspapers or circulate elaborate pamphlets may have only a more limited type of access to public officials. Their methods should not be condemned as tactics of obstruction and harassment as long as the assembly and petition are peaceable, as these were.
There is no question that petitioners had as their purpose a protest against the arrest of Florida A. & M. students for trying to integrate public theatres. The sheriff’s testimony indicates that he well understood the purpose of the rally. The petitioners who testified unequivocally stated that the group was protesting the arrests, and state and local policies of segregation, including segregation of the jail. This testimony was not contradicted or even questioned. The fact that no one gave a formal speech, that no elaborate handbills were distributed, and that the group was not laden with signs would seem immaterial. Such methods are not the sine qua non of petitioning for the redress of grievances. The group did sing “freedom” songs. And history shows that a song can be a powerful tool of protest. There was no violence; no threats of violence; no attempted jail break; no storming of a prison; no plan or plot to do anything but protest. The evidence is uncontradicted that the prisoners’ conduct did not upset the jailhouse routine; things went on as they normally would. None of the group entered the jail. Indeed, they moved back from the entrance as they were instructed. There was no shoving, no pushing, no disorder or threat of riot. It is said that some of the group blocked part of the driveway leading to the jail entrance. The chief jailer to be sure testified that vehicles would not have been able to use the driveway. Never did the students locate themselves so as to cause interference with persons or vehicles going to or coming from the jail. Indeed, it is undisputed that the sheriff and deputy sheriff, in separate cars, were able to drive up this driveway to the parking places near the entrance and that no one obstructed their path. Further, it is undisputed that the entrance to the jail was not blocked. And wherever the students were requested to move they did so. If there was congestion, the solution was a further request to move to lawns or parking areas, not complete ejection and arrest.
We do violence to the First Amendment when we permit this “petition for redress of grievances” to be turned into a trespass action. It does not help to analogize this problem to the problem of picketing. Picketing is a form of protest usually directed against private interests. I do not see how rules governing picketing in general are relevant to this express constitutional right to assemble and to petition for redress of grievances, in the first place the jailhouse grounds were not marked with “NO TRESPASSING!” signs, nor does respondent claim that the public was generally excluded from the grounds. Only the sheriff’s fiat transformed lawful conduct into an unlawful trespass. To say that a private owner could have done the same if the rally had taken place on private property is to speak of a different case, as an assembly and a petition for redress of grievances run to government not to private proprietors.
When we allow Florida to construe her “malicious trespass” statute to bar a person from going on property knowing it is not his own and to apply that prohibition to public property, we discard Cox and Edwards. Would the case be any different if, as is common, the demonstration took place outside a building which housed both the jail and the legislative body? I think not.
There may be some public places which are so clearly committed to other purposes that their use for the airing of grievances is anomalous. There may be some instances in which assemblies and petitions for redress of grievances are not consistent with other necessary purposes of public property. A noisy meeting may be out of keeping with the serenity of the statehouse or the quiet of the courthouse. No one, for example, would suggest that the Senate gallery is the proper place for a vociferous protest rally. And, in other cases it may be necessary to adjust the right to petition for redress of grievances to the other interests inherent in the uses to which the public property is normally put. But this is quite different than saying that all public places are off-limits to people with grievances. And it is farther yet from saying that the “custodian” of the public property in his discretion can decide when public places shall be used for the communication of ideas, especially the constitutional right to assemble and petition for redress of grievances. For to place such discretion in any public official, be he the “custodian” of the public property or the local police commissioner, is to place those who assert their First Amendment rights at his mercy. It gives him the awesome power to decide whose ideas may be expressed and who shall be denied a place to air their claims and petition their government.
That tragic consequence happens today when a trespass law is used to bludgeon those who peacefully exercise a First Amendment right to protest to government against one of the most grievous of all modern oppressions which some of our states are inflicting on our citizens.
Today a trespass law is used to penalize people for exercising a constitutional right. Tomorrow a disorderly conduct statute, a breach of the peace statute, a vagrancy statute will be put to the same end. It is said that the sheriff did not make the arrests because of the views which petitioners espoused. That excuse is usually given, as we know from the cases involving arrests of minority groups for breaches of the peace, unlawful assemblies, and parading without a permit. The charge against William Penn, who preached a nonconformist doctrine in a street in London, was that he caused “a great concourse and tumult of people” in contempt of the King and “to the great disturbance of the peace.” That was in 1670. In modern times also such arrests are usually sought to be justified by some legitimate function of government. Yet by allowing these orderly and civilized protests against injustice to be suppressed, we only increase the forces of frustration which the conditions of second-class citizenship are generating amongst us.
Case: Adderley v. State of Florida
Citation: 385 U.S. 39 (1966)
Facts: Harriet Louise Alderley, along with 31 other picketers, went to a Florida jail where their classmates were being held and protested their imprisonment along with Florida’s racial segregation laws. They were arrested and convicted for “trespass with a malicious and mischievous intent, which Adderley challenged on the grounds that the conviction was unconstitutional.
Issue: Whether the conviction of the students violates their right to freedom of speech and assembly guaranteed by the First Amendment
Decision: No, their conviction is constitutional.
Reasoning: States can control access to their property for nondiscriminatory purposes even if it restricts expressive activity because jails are not traditionally for demonstration.
Significance: The Court’s ruling in Adderley limited the scope of the First Amendment’s right to Freedom of Speech and Assembly on government property– a setback for protestors.
Adderly v. State of Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966)
Facts: Students protested at a county jail and were arrested for trespassing on jail grounds.
Issue: Did the arrests violate the students’ First and Fourteenth Amendment rights?
Decision: No.
Reason: jail is not public property and state could control access to its property without violating free speech or assembly rights.
Adderly v. State of Florida (1966)
Facts: Harriette Adderly and 31 other students from Florida A&M University were protesting the arrest of other students involved in civil rights protests. They peacefully gathered at the driveway of a county jail in Tallahassee, Florida, and were told to leave by the police. They were arrested and charged with trespassing on public property when they refused to leave.
Question: Did the arrest of the student protesters violate their 1st and 14th Amendment rights to freedom of speech and assembly?
Holding: For the State of Florida.
Reasoning: Justice Hugo Black reasoned that the county jail is not a traditional public forum like the park or sidewalk and that the protest interfered with the operation of the jail despite being peaceful.
Adderly v. State of Florida
385 U.S. 39 (1966)
Facts: Harriett Adderley and 31 other students from Florida A&M University were arrested for trespassing when they protested racial segregation by demonstrating outside a county jail in Tallahassee, Florida. The protest was peaceful but took place on jail property, and the sheriff ordered the demonstrators to leave. When they refused, they were arrested under a Florida trespass statute.
Issue: Did the arrests and convictions of the protesters for trespassing on jail property violate their First Amendment rights to free speech and assembly?
Holding: No. The Court upheld the convictions, ruling that the government could control access to its own property for nonexpressive purposes, such as maintaining security at a jail.
Reasoning: The Court, in a 5-4 decision, found that the state did not violate the protesters’ First Amendment rights because they were on jail property, which was not a traditional public forum.The government, as the property owner, had the right to regulate access to its facilities for legitimate purposes unrelated to speech suppression.
Adderly v. State of Florida
Citation: 385 U.S. 39 (1966)
Court: Supreme Court of the United States
Date Decided: November 14, 1966
Facts: In 1963, a group of students from Florida A&M University, a historically Black college, participated in a protest against racial segregation and civil rights abuses. The protest took place on the premises of the Leon County jail in Tallahassee, Florida. The students, including Harriet Louise Adderley, were demonstrating against the arrests of fellow students and the general treatment of African Americans. They entered the jail grounds, blocking access to a driveway, and refused to leave when asked by the sheriff. Subsequently, they were arrested and charged with trespassing on public property.
Issue: Did the convictions of the students for trespassing violate their First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and assembly?
Holding: The Supreme Court upheld the convictions, ruling that the students’ First Amendment rights were not violated.
Reasoning: The Court, in a majority opinion written by Justice Black, held that the State of Florida had the right to control its property and could limit access to certain areas for non-governmental purposes. The jail premises were not a public forum open to any and all demonstrations, and the state had a legitimate interest in maintaining order and security at the jail. The Court found that the students’ actions constituted a trespass and that the enforcement of trespass laws in this context did not infringe upon their constitutional rights to free speech and assembly.
Significance: Adderley v. State of Florida is significant for its interpretation of the limits of free speech and assembly, particularly concerning the use of government property for protests and demonstrations.
Title: Adderley v. State of Florida (1966)
Facts:
This case arose when Harriett Louise Adderley and 31 other individuals, primarily students from Florida A&M University, were arrested during a demonstration at the Leon County Jail in Tallahassee, Florida. The protest was sparked by the arrest of fellow students the previous day and was part of a broader movement against racial segregation. The demonstrators blocked the jail’s driveway and refused to leave after being warned by the sheriff. They were charged under a Florida trespass law for “trespass with a malicious and mischievous intent.” Their convictions were upheld through appeals, eventually reaching the U.S. Supreme Court.
Question:
The key question was whether the students’ convictions under Florida’s trespass law violated their constitutional rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, including free speech, assembly, and equal protection.
Holding:
The Supreme Court upheld the convictions in a 5-4 decision, ruling that the enforcement of the trespass law did not infringe upon the demonstrators’ constitutional rights.
Reasoning:
The Court reasoned that the jail property was not a public forum traditionally open for public expression, such as streets or parks. As such, the state had the authority to regulate its use for security and operational purposes. The sheriff’s actions were not based on opposition to the protest’s message but rather on maintaining order and ensuring the jail’s functioning. The Court found that the Florida trespass law was neither vague nor discriminatory and that it was applied appropriately in this case. Therefore, there was no violation of First Amendment rights or denial of due process or equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. The dissenting justices argued that the trespass law was used to suppress constitutionally protected freedoms of speech and assembly.
This case considers protest on public property which does not enter into the category of public forum as of limited protection by the first amendment’s freedom of assembly power. A number of petitioners gathered outside of a privately owned prison and blocked entrance to it on the basis that the prison was presumably practicing segregation, and were arrested in line with the governmental interest of protecting its ability to detain and imprison its own citizens to no end.
Harriet Louise Adderley and 200 others assembled in a non-public jail driveway to protest the arrests of fellow students and policies on racial segregation. Adderley and 31 others were convicted in Florida for trespass with a malicious and mischievous intent.
Were the petitioners denied their rights of Free Speech, assembly, petition, due process and equal protection?
In a 5-4 decision, there were no constitutional violations in this case. The Florida statute was defined and applied as Black argued; preventing it from imposing broad infringements on speech and expression rights. And as the sheriff acted to maintain access to the jail, there were no 1st Amendment violations. The state does have the power to control its own property for lawful, nondiscriminatory purposes.
The Supreme Court ruled that the arrest of demonstrators for trespassing on government property did not violate their First Amendment rights. This decision underscored a restrictive view of protest rights, particularly on public property, which is not deemed a traditional public forum.
In Adderley v. Florida, the Supreme Court ruled that the convictions of protesters for trespassing on a jail driveway did not violate their First or Fourteenth Amendment rights. The majority opinion held that the state could control access to its property for lawful, nondiscriminatory reasons without infringing on free speech rights.
Title: Adderly v. State of Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966)
Facts: In Adderly v. State of Florida, a group of students engaged in a peaceful protest outside the Duval County Jail in Florida. The students were demonstrating against racial segregation and attempting to communicate with inmates inside the jail. Despite their peaceful intentions, the protesters refused to leave when ordered to do so by law enforcement officers. Subsequently, they were arrested and charged with trespassing under Florida law.
Question: The central question in Adderly v. State of Florida was whether the arrest of the protesters for trespassing violated their First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and assembly, as well as the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.
Holding: The Supreme Court held that the arrest of the protesters did not violate their First or Fourteenth Amendment rights. The Court reasoned that the state, as the owner of the jail property, had the authority to regulate access to it. Moreover, the protesters were not expressing grievances to the government, but were instead attempting to interfere with the normal functioning of the jail. Therefore, the state’s interest in maintaining order and security outweighed the protesters’ rights in this case.
Supreme court upholds convictions of arrested students after a protest at a non-public jail, the significance of the case showcases just how far the first amendment right can go.
Facts:
Harriet Louise Adderley and a group of approximately 200 others assembled in a non-public jail driveway to protest the arrests of fellow students.
Adderley plus thirty-one others were convicted in a Florida court on a charge of trespassing
Question:
Were the petitioners denied their rights of free speech, assembly, petition, due process of law and equal protection of the laws by the First and Fourteenth Amendments?
385 U.S. 39 (1966)
Rule of Law: A state may control the use of its own property by preventing protesting activities as long as it applies content-neutral regulations evenhandedly and does so for a nondiscriminatory purpose.
Facts: Harriet Louise Adderley and thirty-one other persons (defendants) went to a Florida jail where their classmates were being held. The group protested their peer’s imprisonment and protested against general state policies favoring racial segregation. The group was arrested and convicted in the County Judge’s Court of Leon County, Florida. Adderley challenged their convictions on the grounds that their arrest violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the convictions.
Issue: Whether a statute criminalizing protesting in front of a county jail violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments’ guarantees of free speech, assembly, petition, due process of law, and equal protection of the laws.
Holding: (delivered by Justice Black) No. The Florida county sheriff has the power to constitutionally direct a large crowd of people to leave the jail grounds. Nothing in the evidentiary record suggests that the sheriff exercised this power because of any disagreement with the objectives of the protest or any expression made by the protesters. Rather, the sheriff objected to their presence on that specific area of the jail. The protesters refused to honor the sheriff’s request that they leave the grounds and nothing in the First or Fourteenth Amendments prevents the State of Florida from evenhandedly enforcing its general trespass statute against the protesters. Just like an owner of private property, the state has power to control the use of its own property for its own lawful nondiscriminatory purpose. It does not matter that the protesters acted peacefully, as the Constitution does not permit people to protest whenever, however, or wherever they please.
Case: Adderly v. State of Florida (1966)
Facts: Adderly and a group were protesting in front of a non-public driveway against the arrest of fellow students and segregation policies. They were convicted of trespassing for refusing to leave.
Question: Were they denied their rights of free speech, assembly, petition, due process, and essentially equal protection, all guaranteed rights in the first and fourteenth Amendments?
Opinion: 5-4; in favor of Florida.
Reasoning: Florida law was clear and properly applied. The law did not impose broad infringements on first amendment rights.
Adderly v State of Florida
385 US 39 (1966)
Facts: Harriet Adderley and a group of around 200 others assembled in a non-public driveway to protest the arrest of fellow students and the state/local policies of racial segregation which included segregated jails. Adderley and 31 others were convicted in Florida court on charges of “trespassing with a malicious and mischievous intent” for their refusal to leave when requested
Question: Were the petitioners denied their rights of free speech, assembly, petition, due process, and equal protection guaranteed in the 1st and 14th amendments?
Opinion: no, 5-4
Reasoning: the Florida statute was clearly defined and applied, which prevented it from imposing broad infringements on speech and expression rights
Adderley and thirty-one others were convicted in a Florida court on a charge of “trespass with a malicious and mischievous intent” after protesting on a jail driveway. They appealed, arguing that the conviction violated their rights of free speech, assembly, petition, due process of law, and equal protection of the laws as guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The court ruled there was no violation as the law was very specific which prevented it from imposing broad infringements on speech and expression rights.
Adderly v State of Florida concluded that there were no violations against the 1st Amendment, as the halting of protests was in order to ensure easy access and traffic to and from the jail (?)
32 students were convicted in Florida for “trespass with a malicious and mischievous intent” upon the premises of the county jail contrary. They were there to protest at the arrest of their colleagues the day before and “more generally against state and local policies and practices of racial segregation, including segregation of the jail.” The county sheriff gave multiple warnings asking them to leave. Some students left, but others remained and were arrested. The students contended that their conviction denied them “rights of free speech, assembly, petition, due process of law and equal protection of the laws as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.” In affirming their convictions in a 5-4 ruling, The Court determined that jails were not appropriate places for protest because they are not open to the public and exist narrowly for security purposes. “[t]here was ample evidence to support petitioners’ trespass convictions for remaining on jail grounds reserved for jail uses after they had been directed to leave by the sheriff. There was no evidence at all that petitioners were arrested or convicted for their views or objectives…[T]he United States Constitution does not forbid a State to control the use of its own property for its own lawful nondiscriminatory purpose.”
Protestors were arrested for gathering in a jail driveway to protest segregated jails. The Court rejected the argument that the demonstrators had a constitutional right to stay on the property for their demonstration, stating that the state had the power to preserve its property for its lawful purposes.
In Adderly v Florida, the main question for the court was whether the protesters had their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights abridged. In a split opinion, the court ruled that the student’s rights had not been infringed upon, as the jail is considered private property, so the freedoms around protesting aren’t the same.
I. Adderley v. Florida
II. Citation: 385 US 39 (1966)
III.Facts: Harriet Louise Adderley and a group of approximately 200 others assembled in a non-public jail driveway to protest the arrests of fellow students and the state and local policies of racial segregation which included segregation in jails. Adderley and thirty-one others were convicted in a Florida court on a charge of “trespass with a malicious and mischievous intent” for their refusal to leave the driveway when requested to do so.
IV. Question: Were the petitioners denied their rights of free speech, assembly, petition, due process of law and equal protection of the laws as guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments?
V. Decision: The Court found that there were no constitutional violations in this case. The language of the Florida statute was clearly defined and applied, argued Justice Black, which prevented it from imposing broad infringements on speech and expression rights. Furthermore, since the sheriff acted to maintain access to the jail house and not because he “objected to what was being sung . . . or disagreed with the objectives of the protest,” there were no First Amendment violations. Black concluded that the state does have the power to control its own property for lawful, nondiscriminatory purposes.
Harriet Louise Adderley and thirty-one other persons visited their classmates who were being incarcerated in a jail in Florida. The group demonstrated against the incarceration of their peer and against broader state laws that support racial segregation. The Leon County, Florida, County Judge’s Court placed the group under arrest and found them guilty. Adderley contested their convictions, claiming that the First and Fourteenth Amendments had been broken by their arrest. The convictions were upheld by the Florida Supreme Court after an appeal. Certiorari was granted by the United States Supreme Court.
Adderley v. State of Florida (1966) was a United States Supreme Court case that addressed the constitutionality of arrests made by local law enforcement officers during a peaceful civil rights protest.
In 1964, a group of African American students organized a protest at the County Jail in Tallahassee, Florida, to challenge the jail’s practice of segregating black and white prisoners. The students gathered outside the jail’s gates to sing and chant, and some of them sat on the grass near the entrance. Local law enforcement officers, including deputy sheriffs and state troopers, ordered the protesters to disperse, but they refused.
The officers then arrested the protesters for obstructing the entrance to the jail. The protesters argued that their arrest violated their First Amendment right to peacefully assemble and their Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.
The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, ruled that the protesters’ arrest did not violate the Constitution. The Court held that the protesters were on jail property, which was not a traditional public forum, and that their presence there interfered with the jail’s normal functioning.
The Court also noted that the protesters’ conduct was not purely expressive and that they had engaged in disruptive behavior that justified their arrest. The Court further held that the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures did not apply because the protesters were on jail property and had no reasonable expectation of privacy.
The decision in Adderley v. State of Florida was significant because it limited the scope of First Amendment protection for peaceful protests on government property. It established that the government had the authority to regulate the use of government property, even if it was generally open to the public, and to enforce reasonable restrictions on the time, place, and manner of protest activities.
However, the decision also generated criticism from civil rights advocates, who argued that it gave law enforcement officers too much discretion to arrest peaceful protesters and limit their free speech rights. The decision remained controversial and was cited in later cases involving protests on government property.
The question before the court was if the petitioners denied their rights of free speech, assembly, petition, due process of law and equal protection of the laws as guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments? The Court found that there were no constitutional violations in this case. Justice Black concluded that the state does have the power to control its own property for lawful, nondiscriminatory purposes.
I agree with Justices Douglas, Warren, Brennan, and Fortas in this case. I understand the conviction and why it can be considered trespassing for the student demonstrator to remain on jail grounds after being directed to leave. However, for an establishment as controversial as a government-run jail, there should be a right of the people to protest against unjust convictions, the holding of political prisoners, or other contentious issues. There must be a way to allow the jail to continue to be used for “security purposes” while allowing people to exercise their first amendment rights.
I find it odd that jails are not considered public grounds and are “private” because of their security purposes. Considering all of the people incarcerated inside are charged and deemed guilty by the GOVERNMENT you would think the places they put them in also belong to the government. Additionally, making the jail grounds private property essentially guarantees that no protests can take place nearby. Considering how large of a role jails, incarceration, and the criminal justice system play in the daily American life you would think people would be granted to the ability to protest on jail grounds for anything they see as unjust or a violation of citizens’ rights.
I understand, but would you want protestors blocking the entrance to a police dept or a firehouse preventing first responders from responding first
This case deals with the arrest of 107 protestors in a Florida jail, the protesters were peacefully assembling at the jail. The jail was not considered public property and the protesters were disrupting the flow of jail vehicles through their protests. The protesters were then charged with trespassing with malicious intent. I believe that the courts agreed that the protesters were trespassing, but it is conflicted on whether or not the trespassing occurred with the purpose of disrupting official police business. From my understanding of the case, I believe the trespassing charges are hard to dismiss, it was private property, the protesters intentionally went onto the property and then did not leave when asked to. I do however, think that the elements of maliciously trespassing have not been met. The sheriff was aware of the purpose of the protest, there was never any intention to disrupt the flow of vehicles and there were no other disturbances to the jail’s routine. The court reversed all three charges, breach of peace, obstruction of public passages and parading with the intent of obstruction. The court reversed the public passages charge because there were other parades that disrupted the flow of traffic in that area.
yes, “in that area”
In Adderly v. State of Florida, the Supreme Court upheld the convictions of student protesters for trespassing on jail grounds after being ordered to leave by the police. The protesters had argued that they had a constitutional right to protest on the property, but the court ruled that the Constitution did not prevent the state from enforcing its trespassing laws.
The case comes to determine the definition of trespassing coming from a “malicious intent.” When protesting is a part of free speech for American or non American citizens to exercise their right. As seen with the students protesting of their classmates to be free due to be arrested from protesting. Protesting is not a malicious intent when it comes to wanting to be visible.
Facts of the case:
Harriet Louise Adderley and thirty-one other people went to a Florida jail where their classmates were being held. The group protested their peer’s imprisonment and against general state policies favoring racial segregation. The group was arrested and convicted in the County Judge’s Court of Leon County, Florida. Adderley challenged their convictions on the grounds that their arrest violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the convictions. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Harriet Louise Adderley and a group of approximately 200 others assembled in a non-public jail driveway to protest the arrests of fellow students and the state and local policies of racial segregation which included segregation in jails. Adderley and thirty-one others were convicted in a Florida court on a charge of “trespass with a malicious and mischievous intent” for their refusal to leave the driveway when requested to do so.
I find it interesting that they were warned prior to being arrested, perhaps I have not been to enough protests but typically I never see MUCH of a warning, just a rapid escalation that results in people getting arrested.
I guess the protestors were acting as though they were already free. Let me explain.
Were they warned about being arrested? Yes. Did the remaining students deserve to be arrested? Yes, in a way — according to the law. But that illegal act does not to say anything about their morals, intellect, etc.
Some of us know: to better the system, sometimes you have to break the rules; otherwise, your cause will probably get nowhere. The key to civil disobedience, direct action, or un-permitted protests is acting as though you are already free.
I don’t think they deserved it. Do I have much of a legal argument? No.
In a conversation about civil disobedience, using the state’s rules to justify your action is near impossible.
I think that is what happened here.
I respect the work lawyer activists have done over the centuries but we should also appreciate those who failed in the eyes of the state.
This case dealt with violations of freedom of speech. Protestors were removed from private jail property. Due to the law in Florida statue the USSC did not find a violation in the first and fourteenth amendments. The protestors were removed not because of their race- rather because of their speech but because of the interest of the jail to maintain access to the jailhouse.
The main issue in this case addresses whether the first amendment or due process and equal protections rights were violated in their arrest. The case ruled that no such violations were made in this case on the grounds that “[t]here was ample evidence to support petitioners’ trespass convictions for remaining on jail grounds reserved for jail uses after they had been directed to leave by the sheriff.”
Something that we emphasized in 354 was the variety of time, place, and manner restrictions that the USSC and federal law can impose on speech. While the government cannot necessarily censor or prohibit what you say, it has the power to restrict where and when (occasionally how) you say it. In this case the Court clearly relies on this principle to rule the case against the student from Florida’s university who were protesting on the grounds of a jail.
Deleted userOct 13, 2014
Freedom of assembly doesn’t mean someone can come into my house and it doesn’t mean they can go into this private area.
Lucas Woody Stanfield
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Deleted userOct 13, 2014
The protesters were given a fair warning that there would be consequences if they chose not to leave the property. No one should have been surprised when they were arrested.
-Egle S.
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Deleted userOct 13, 2014
The protesters freedom of assembly was arguably not abridged since the jail is not open to the public. The state could argue that they are protecting the protesters because there is a reason why they separate jails from the public. I think if they would have left after the first warning then it would have remained peaceful assembly. I feel like the protest should have done in front of people that could change that like the state governing office.
-G. Bedolla
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Deleted userOct 13, 2014
The freedom of assembly should be protected, but only when on public property. I’m sure the jail was only following the rules. They could have petitioned the government or protested elsewhere for a change in the law.
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Deleted userOct 13, 2014
I’m okay with free speech, but they were not on public property so they are not protected. They were warned that they were not on public property, not abut what they were saying and protesting. You have on rights on private property, only those they choose to afford you. You are only protected from the government of the ability of free speech, not the consequences for what you say. -d. Mortimer
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