An aspect that stood out to me in the article was how the authors distinguish appropriate precedent use of the Barnette ruling: “While the holding of Barnette may be justifiable on establishment or free exercise grounds, the principle cannot be that any citizen who considers a law to be a form of establishment or an illicit interference with her free exercise rights is ipso facto correct. Such a view would create a limitless exception for those who claim religious exemptions from otherwise valid laws” (Blasi and Shiffrin, 455). This point is so powerfully conveyed and applies to many relevant cases included in the scope of PolS 354- where religious exemptions can not be misapplied as wavers for not practicing the requirement of the law.
In reading the chapter, I agree with this narrative over how mechanically similar Gobitis was to Barnette- I would argue that this should be a classic work to illustrate to those learning Constitutional Law this concept when behavioral jurisprudence is made appropriate when its mechanical variant cannot differentiate them. Even within my own summaries of the cases, not only are the facts identical, so too are the issues- and the only way I could have differentiated them were the years and how one reversed the other. Yet the work Blasi and Shiffrin have done illustrates the palpable political weights and effects that are obscured when only looking at the cases themselves and not the broader context. The fact that this case had less of an effect on the Jehovah’s Witnesses and only really joined the broader jurisprudence over the American flag is telling that the issue was not solely about religion- it had more weight regarding the state interest of imparting onto the student’s elementary patriotism. And because of this, I’ve grown to appreciate the application of political science to constitutional law- I would have never made the connections these cases had to the histories of Nazism, the Jehovah’s Witnesses, and of the new justices that came in just a few years’ time. Though, just as I am in awe, I am in deep fear of this process. It was once said by a passerby that the Supreme Court has generally been in favor of expanding religious rights, and that one midterm essay combined with recent attacks on reproductive rights through religion has made me ever so aware of powder keg the court represents- where one majority opinion can strike a match and make moot some rights so many holds dear. That volatile nature, one that must be well balanced and well-kept, makes the court wield power that, while one may claim godlike, can fall into the hands of the fallible.
I thought the reading was informative because I was unaware of the violent aftermath Jehovah’s Witnesses had to experience from the court’s decision in Gobitis.
This landmark case has a lot of background to it and is without a doubt a case that had a lot of impact on American society, whether from a congressional or a social aspect. The authors discuss how Barnette contributes to the discussion of freedom of thought and speech from a patriotic and historical lens.
This case is so important as it shows that the freedom not to speak is just as important as the freedom to speak and should be protected in the same way. I think forcing the children to salute the flag under the justification of unity is also very dangerous because unity is too subjective and to push one’s agenda through the idea of unity infringes on the freedom of expression of others. Moreover, I think that it is a double-edged sword, I think that if someone expects an individual to respect their beliefs, they should also respect the other person’s belief, even if it goes against theirs, and punishing the students is not respecting their beliefs.
I think this topic is related with tolerance. Even that don’t saluting the flag may look disrespect for some people, I think that is nothing wrong with that. Many people take national symbols very seriously others do not. May other people like the Jehovah’s Witnesses consider that it is against their religion. I believe that have to be respect and tolerance between peoples’ beliefs. I think is excessive trying to punish someone because is not agree doing something that goes against him or her belief. It is a violation of the Establisment Clause.
Deleted userNov 1, 2015
All in all, the work contributes to a body of knowledge because it clarifies what changes in both the composition and jurisprudence of the Court led to Barnette shifting so rapidly from Gobitis. Furthermore, I would somewhat agree with the argument the work presents to justify the decision. While I agree with the notion that the decision set out to protect thought, I believe that idea of the “right not to speak” played an equal part. This serves to protect established thought which digresses from the norm and subsequently allows those who hold opposing views to express these views in an indirect manner.
An aspect that stood out to me in the article was how the authors distinguish appropriate precedent use of the Barnette ruling: “While the holding of Barnette may be justifiable on establishment or free exercise grounds, the principle cannot be that any citizen who considers a law to be a form of establishment or an illicit interference with her free exercise rights is ipso facto correct. Such a view would create a limitless exception for those who claim religious exemptions from otherwise valid laws” (Blasi and Shiffrin, 455). This point is so powerfully conveyed and applies to many relevant cases included in the scope of PolS 354- where religious exemptions can not be misapplied as wavers for not practicing the requirement of the law.
In reading the chapter, I agree with this narrative over how mechanically similar Gobitis was to Barnette- I would argue that this should be a classic work to illustrate to those learning Constitutional Law this concept when behavioral jurisprudence is made appropriate when its mechanical variant cannot differentiate them. Even within my own summaries of the cases, not only are the facts identical, so too are the issues- and the only way I could have differentiated them were the years and how one reversed the other. Yet the work Blasi and Shiffrin have done illustrates the palpable political weights and effects that are obscured when only looking at the cases themselves and not the broader context. The fact that this case had less of an effect on the Jehovah’s Witnesses and only really joined the broader jurisprudence over the American flag is telling that the issue was not solely about religion- it had more weight regarding the state interest of imparting onto the student’s elementary patriotism. And because of this, I’ve grown to appreciate the application of political science to constitutional law- I would have never made the connections these cases had to the histories of Nazism, the Jehovah’s Witnesses, and of the new justices that came in just a few years’ time. Though, just as I am in awe, I am in deep fear of this process. It was once said by a passerby that the Supreme Court has generally been in favor of expanding religious rights, and that one midterm essay combined with recent attacks on reproductive rights through religion has made me ever so aware of powder keg the court represents- where one majority opinion can strike a match and make moot some rights so many holds dear. That volatile nature, one that must be well balanced and well-kept, makes the court wield power that, while one may claim godlike, can fall into the hands of the fallible.
I thought the reading was informative because I was unaware of the violent aftermath Jehovah’s Witnesses had to experience from the court’s decision in Gobitis.
This landmark case has a lot of background to it and is without a doubt a case that had a lot of impact on American society, whether from a congressional or a social aspect. The authors discuss how Barnette contributes to the discussion of freedom of thought and speech from a patriotic and historical lens.
Very interesting case
https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/west-virginia-v.-barnette-the-freedom-to-not-pledge-allegiance
This case is so important as it shows that the freedom not to speak is just as important as the freedom to speak and should be protected in the same way. I think forcing the children to salute the flag under the justification of unity is also very dangerous because unity is too subjective and to push one’s agenda through the idea of unity infringes on the freedom of expression of others. Moreover, I think that it is a double-edged sword, I think that if someone expects an individual to respect their beliefs, they should also respect the other person’s belief, even if it goes against theirs, and punishing the students is not respecting their beliefs.
I think this topic is related with tolerance. Even that don’t saluting the flag may look disrespect for some people, I think that is nothing wrong with that. Many people take national symbols very seriously others do not. May other people like the Jehovah’s Witnesses consider that it is against their religion. I believe that have to be respect and tolerance between peoples’ beliefs. I think is excessive trying to punish someone because is not agree doing something that goes against him or her belief. It is a violation of the Establisment Clause.
Deleted userNov 1, 2015
All in all, the work contributes to a body of knowledge because it clarifies what changes in both the composition and jurisprudence of the Court led to Barnette shifting so rapidly from Gobitis. Furthermore, I would somewhat agree with the argument the work presents to justify the decision. While I agree with the notion that the decision set out to protect thought, I believe that idea of the “right not to speak” played an equal part. This serves to protect established thought which digresses from the norm and subsequently allows those who hold opposing views to express these views in an indirect manner.