Syllabus, PolS 356, BLST 356, GWS 356
Constitutional Law 356: Women, Gender, and Privacy (ver. 1-23-2026)
Section 1 Course Information
(a) Professor Lyles
Spring 2026
9:30 – 10:45, T, TH, 209 BH
Student Drop-In Hours: TH 12:30 – 2:30 by appointment only.
Office: 1147 BSB
TA: Saraf Wasima, swasi@uic.edu
(b) Catalog Description: Political Science 356 Constitutional Law: Women, Gender, and Privacy. 3 hours. Multidisciplinary examination of U.S. constitutional law and politics in shaping issues of gender, privacy, race, and sexual orientation, including reproduction, labor, sexual harassment, political participation, and crime. Same as AAST 356 and GWS 356.
Section 2 Women’s Rights
(a) The Anglo-American legal tradition purports to value equality, by which it means, at a minimum, equal application of the law to all persons. Nevertheless, throughout this country’s history, women have been denied the most basic rights of citizenship, allowed only limited participation in the marketplace, and otherwise denied access to power, dignity, and respect. Women have instead been largely occupied with providing the personal and household services necessary to sustain family life. Goldstein et. al., The Constitutional and Legal Rights of Women
(b) “…the law has furthered male dominance by explicitly excluding women from the public sphere and by refusing to regulate the domestic sphere to which they are thus confined. … the law has legitimized sex discrimination through the articulation of an ideology that justifies differential treatment on the basis of perceived differences between men and women.” Taub and Schneider, The Politics of Law
(c) Historically, woman suffrage and abolition had been connected…. [However] the unified National American Women’s Suffrage Association turned away from universal suffrage in favor of literacy qualifications, excluded southern blacks from their organization, and argued that giving women the vote would restore white supremacy by enlarging the white voter base, making it impossible for blacks to gain a majority. Educational qualifications that would give most white women the vote would render the black women’s vote too small to matter, as a consequence of their lower educational rates. In this way, white supremacy could be maintained without dependence on the state, constitutional changes, and segregation laws then being put into place… Though historians usually focus on the race issue as a prime obstacle to the suffragists’ success, there is considerable evidence to indicate that the race issue was, in fact, a major causative factor in the emergence in the 1890s of the woman suffrage movement in the South. It is, indeed, one of the ironies of history that racism was part of a move toward gender equality. Darlene Clark Hine and Christie Ann Farnham, Black Women and the Right to Vote
Section 3 Brief Course Description
(a) This course provides a survey of the legal history of women in the United States and their continuing struggle for equal rights and protections under the yoke of a constitution that rationalized both slavery and patriarchy. We explore the extent to which women in the United States have used the federal courts to secure fundamental freedoms, including “freedom from inferior constitutional or juridical status,” “freedom from fertility and family discrimination,” and “freedom from fear.” In short, we will survey the extent to which women in the United States have achieved “emancipation” through law. “Emancipation,” paraphrasing Joan Hoff, means equitable treatment that is not grounded in dominant male values and does not violate women’s sense of community, commonality, and/or culture by demanding assimilation or acceptance of stereotypic “feminine” roles as the price for full participation in U.S. society and equal protection under the law. These issues will be discussed within the overall framework of the role and participation of courts, primarily the U. S. Supreme Court, in formulating and implementing public policy. This discussion should allow us to consider such factors as:
(a) The nature, characteristics, and dynamics of the political system and the policymaking process: e.g., system features, values, and structures, participants in the policy process, and the development and implementation of public policy.
(b) The nature of civil liberty conflict, including how and why such conflicts begin, and the role and participation of various actors in such conflict, e.g., the participation of organized groups and the roles of law enforcement, prosecutors, lawyers, and judges.
(c) The relation and interrelation of courts to other governing institutions in dealing with civil liberties, e.g., the role and participation of the Congress, the President, the executive and administrative agencies, and state and local governments.
(d) The political and social impact of law and social change, factors affecting compliance and non-compliance, and the consequences of court actions. The primary concern of this seminar is how courts have responded to issues of constitutional equality for women. These issues include: (1) gender discrimination, (2) women’s rights, (3) privacy (as it relates to contraception and sex), (4) sexual orientation (e.g., gay and lesbian issues), (5) sexual harassment, (7) pornography, rape and other forms of violence against women, and (8) political participation (as it relates to women’s suffrage, participation, and representation).
(e) The broad categories above include a plethora of legal issues, including employment discrimination, affirmative action, gender-based work classifications, women’s suffrage, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, all-male juries, male-only estate administration, gender-based G.I. benefits and veteran preferences in hiring, gender-based survivor benefits, military promotion, social security contributions, divorce and child support payments, social security taxes and calculations, fathers’ rights and the rights of unwed fathers, marriage and alimony, the draft, education and single-sex admission policies, rape laws, miscegenation, procreation and the right of privacy, sterilization, contraception, pregnancy and pregnancy leave (for both men and women), abortion, the “oppression” of pornography, sexual orientation, homosexual sodomy, sexual harassment, poverty, etc.
(f) Students will examine the parallels and contradictions between the Supreme Court’s denial or promotion of “women’s rights,” “white women’s rights,” and “Black women’s rights.” Students will explore several readings in the field of “Critical Race Feminism” that explore the legal status and lived experiences of women of color. The sexualization of “race” occurred within the context of changing legal practices [see Lyles PolS/BLST 358]. During the African slave trade, for example, the sexual exploitation of enslaved women was commonplace. For example, Black women, especially young girls, were often given greater freedom on slave ships to make them available for the ship’s male crews’ sexual exploitation. “White men of every social rank slept with Negro women. The Colonists and European travelers in the colonies frequently pointed to this facet of American life.” In fact, for most of this nation’s history, the laws have encouraged the sexual exploitation of Black women and the castration of Black men. The Supreme Court, for example, recognized and defended—as one of the primary justifications for racial segregation and discrimination—the need to prevent black men from having sex with white women, i.e., to “preserve the purity of blood.” Thus, our study of the legal evolution of women’s rights in the United States must acknowledge both the similarities as well as the glaring contradictions between and among the everyday experiences of Black women and “white” women.
(g) Critical Race Feminism (CRF) is a theoretical framework that integrates critical race theory (PolS 358) and feminist jurisprudence to address the unique forms of oppression experienced by women of color. CRF challenges both mainstream feminist theory (which often centers on the experiences of white women) and traditional critical race theory, which usually focuses on the experiences of Black men. The primary tenets of critical race feminism include: (1) Intersectionality and Multiplicative Identity, (2) Centering the Lived Experiences of Women of Color, (3) Recognition of Systemic Oppression, (4) Critique of Liberalism and Anti-Essentialism, and (5) Interest Convergence. These concepts are discussed later in the semester.
Section 4 Your Textbook: Goldstein, Baer, Daum, and Fine, The Constitutional and Legal Rights of Women. Here are several excerpts from the text:
(a) [The term “women’s rights” has three usages in the Goldstein text.] First, it refers to women’s right to be treated by the government the same as men. Women have a right to “equal protection of the law,” and equal treatment in this sense is commanded by the Constitution. In other words, the Constitution directly forbids statutes denying this kind of equality of treatment (e.g., a hypothetical statute saying that robbery of women will not be prosecuted).
(b) Second, the term can refer to women’s rights to be treated differently from men—in other words, favored or “protected” by the law. When used in this sense, the word right does not mean that the Constitution requires such treatment (contra the first usage), but it does mean that the Constitution permits such difference of treatment. Another way of stating this idea is to say that men’s right to “equal protection of the law” does not mean they shall in every way be treated the same as women. The courts recognize that not all groups in society are “similarly situated” and that to compensate for dissimilar societal situations, it may be appropriate to allow unequal treatment by the law in order to attain “equal protection of the law.” The Fourteenth Amendment has been read as sometimes permitting (but not as commanding) such unequal treatment of women.
(c) Third, “women’s rights” can refer to rights that are common to all American citizens but affect women in particularly strong ways, or that affect only women, for reasons that are biological rather than legal. The constitutional right to choose birth control or abortion is in a real sense a woman’s right because women are the ones who give birth and have abortions. (Of course, men share in the right to use birth control and, in a certain sense, share in the right to terminate a pregnancy involving their own offspring. Clearly, however, the potential mother is more drastically and directly affected by the denial or the granting of these rights.)
(d) In earlier editions of the text, the term “woman” was uncontested and was used to refer to biological females. While the terms sex and gender are often used interchangeably, one’s biological sex (i.e., female) may or may not correlate with one’s gender expression (i.e., a female may present as masculine or feminine). As such, a biological female may find that she is discriminated against on the basis of her sex (e.g. a policy that prohibits women from working as a prison guard in a male facility, see Dothard v. Rawlinson [1977]) or that she is discriminated against on the basis of her gender expression (e.g. a woman is denied a promotion because she is perceived as being unfeminine, see Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins [1989]). In recent years, however, growing scientific, socio-cultural, and legal awareness about the intricacies of sex and gender have introduced new complexity to the terms woman, sex, and gender, and this edition now contains sections elaborating on these complexities as they relate to the law.
(e) Recognizing that binary and fixed conceptions of sex (female-male), gender identity (woman-man), and gender expression (masculine-feminine) are oversimplified and inaccurate, the growing trans rights movement seeks to challenge laws, policies, and practices that discriminate against transgender and gender non-conforming individuals. At the national level, litigation has focused on whether or not Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act’s prohibitions on sex discrimination in the workplace include protections for individuals who are targeted for differential treatment because they are transgender or gender non-conforming, as discussed in Chapter 3, and on whether Title IX of the 1972 Education Amendments’ prohibitions on sex discrimination in education include protections for transgender and gender non-conforming students as discussed in Chapter 6.”
Section 5 Course Format
(a) My class will be conducted in a formal seminar format utilizing the Socratic Method and team-based learning. This format lends itself to continuous, active engagement and dialogue between the professor and students, as well as among students themselves. Accordingly, students are required to attend and participate in class. For every required Supreme Court decision, students should be prepared to summarize the competing arguments presented to the Court and to explain the Court’s rationales (reasoning, legal doctrines, use of precedent, etc.) for deciding the case. Meaningful participation, however, requires that students come to class prepared. Should this occur, the class can prove interesting, challenging, and exciting. A word of caution: students must prepare for each class, as the material is cumulative and the workload increases significantly as the semester progresses.
(b) Attendance in class and participation in discussion seminars are both mandatory and essential. I will randomly take attendance. Your attendance grade will be calculated based on the percentage of days you are present when attendance is taken. For example, if attendance is taken 10 times and you are present 8 of the 10 times, then your attendance is 80%. Lastly, students are REQUIRED to “brief” every required case and bring their written briefs to class.
(c) “Freebie” Absence Policy.” Rather than inundating me with emails about missing class, and asking me for make-up assignments, all students will benefit from a set number of excused/unexcused absences (2) per semester without penalty of a grade deduction. In other words, I will drop two attendance days from your total attendance score when calculating your end-of-semester grades. It is your responsibility to ask a classmate for missed class notes.
Section 6 Course Objectives
By the end of the semester, students should be able to:
(a) Explain many of the complex relationships between law and public policy.
(b) Utilize landmark decisions of the United States Supreme Court as vehicles to survey and explain developments relating to women (women’s rights) in the United States.
(c) Apply the interaction of law and politics in discussing the boundaries and constraints of gender, race, privacy, reproduction, violence, power, class, and political participation in defining citizenship in the United States.
(d)Relate the legal process and judicial policy-making to the larger American political process and the constitutional experiences of women.
Section 7 My Teaching Philosophy
(a) Learning to teach at the highest levels of the academy is a never-ending process. It has been argued that most professors lack basic communication skills, and we often use the classroom to enact rituals of control that are rooted in domination and the unjust exercise of power (bell hooks. Teaching to Transgress, p. 5). I have spent much of my career trying to avoid this trap. I want my classroom to be an exciting place where students feel safe to express themselves, for it is only then that we can achieve higher learning. It is my goal to acknowledge everyone’s presence.
(b) I am also acutely aware of the various and unique sensitivities that play out in classes that explore issues of race and gender. We are a diverse group (race, religion, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, identity, etc.), and each of us has something to contribute to our community of learning. I want you to be engaged and active participants. To that end, the wiki also serves as a voice for student expression and the free exchange of ideas—a safe environment sans the fear of expressing ourselves in class.
(c) I find that many students would prefer “more lectures” and “less discussion” in my classes. I try to transgress traditional boundaries and to avoid “assembly-line” approaches to learning. I want to engage students, and I take some non-traditional risks when I teach. As a research-trained academic, I am always looking for answers. We learn from each other. For example, part of my teaching style involves incorporating narratives from my personal experiences into the classroom—not only to personalize the material but also to demonstrate how our individual experiences (both yours and mine) can illuminate and enrich our understanding and deconstruction of academic material. Admittedly, I do most of the talking, but I want us to hear each other, to listen to each other, and to recognize that the work of learning and processing this material is different for each of us.
(d) Most research concludes there are two approaches to teaching constitutional law: (1) lectures and (2) the Socratic Method. Traditional lectures are a popular and primary method of classroom instruction used in college today. I find that the lecture method, if done well, is an efficient system for delivering information to students. However, the lecture method of instruction has been widely criticized, primarily because it places students in a passive learning environment. It may also be less effective in developing analytic skills. The lecture method is weakest in helping students to develop their speaking abilities or critical thinking skills.” But lecturing is also the easiest way for professors to teach; it requires the least amount of knowledge, effort, and risk; requires limited skill; and is highly safe. It worked well for me when I taught introductory classes, such as PolS 101, when I was a TA.
(e) An alternative to the lecture method is the Socratic Method. This is a form of instruction that is popular—and probably predominant—in law school classes, and this method is also used in advanced undergraduate classes, especially law courses. “Professors use the Socratic Method in a wide variety of ways, varying from posing a series of friendly questions to an intense grilling of students with difficult questions and abstract queries.” A debate exists in the political science literature over the benefits and drawbacks of the Socratic Method. “The Socratic Method forces students to think on their feet and to articulate their ideas orally. However, the Socratic Method may not be as efficient in transmitting basic knowledge as the lecture method.” In my classes and seminars, I utilize a modified Socratic Method in a low-threat/discussion manner that does not penalize or humiliate students for poor responses.
(f) However, even my low-threat Socratic Method can be frustrating if students have not read the assigned material, are not prepared for class, or do not attend class. It is frustrating (1) for me, (2) for the students who are prepared for class and want to engage, and (3) for students who are not prepared but who plan on taking detailed class notes to help them prepare for exams. To avoid this frustration, students must come to class prepared! Welcome to my class, and I look forward to an exciting learning experience.
Section 8 Additional Course Rules
(a) Students must utilize the UIC Blackboard, UIC Canvas, and WordPress
(b) Students should be familiar with UIC’s policies regarding academic integrity.
(c) The tape recording of any part of my class (or the use of any other electronic recording device) is strictly prohibited. Why:
- Student Privacy (FERPA): Recordings can capture students’ identifiable voices or images (e.g., asking questions, participating), making them educational records protected under laws like FERPA, which limits their distribution.
- Intellectual Property: Lectures are the professor’s intellectual property (IP); recording and sharing them without permission can infringe on their copyright.
(d) Students with disabilities who require accommodations for access and participation in this course must be registered with the Office of Disability Services (ODS). If you have a documented disability and would like to discuss academic accommodations, please contact me or the TA promptly.
Section 9. Readings/Case Law
Readings under the various topic areas are only suggestive of the vast and growing literature and case law available. All assigned cases must be read before the class session for which they are assigned. Be prepared to review and discuss all assigned cases and readings in class.
Section 10 Required Materials
(a) The Constitutional and Legal Rights of Women: Cases in Law and Social Change, Fourth Edition (2019). Judith A. Baer, Leslie Friedman Goldstein, Courtenay W. Daum, Terri Susan Fine. ISBN 9781640201255.
(b) UIC Blackboard. During the spring 2026 semester, I am migrating from Blackboard to Canvas.
(c) Film: “Iron Jawed Angles” 2004, directed by Katja von Garnier
(d) Film: “Selma” 2014, directed by Ava DuVernay
(e) Film: “Barbie” directed by Greta Gerwig
(f) Nexis Uni (required). From time to time, you will be required to locate cases on your own online, available online via the UIC library
(g) WordPress. https://kevinlyles.digital.uic.edu/
(h) Adrien Katherine Wing, editor, Critical Race Feminism: A Reader. This is a collection of 40 readings, and you are only required to read ONE. Some are on the syllabus, and others can be found online. There is no need to purchase this book. But you are required to read ONE of the readings from the book.
Section 11 Optional Texts: DO NOT BUY THE OPTIONAL TEXTS
(a) Lyles, et. al. Civil Liberties and the Constitution: Cases and Commentaries (9th edition).
(b) Baum. The Supreme Court, any edition, preferably 9th-13th
Section 12 Computation of Course Grade
|
Midterm Exam |
30% |
|
Final Exam |
30% |
|
Attendance |
20% |
|
Online participation, WordPress |
10% |
|
10% of your final class grade |
Section 13 Four Warnings
(a) Everything on the syllabus is required (unless it is marked optional). But not all the required materials listed on the syllabus will be discussed in class. Again, all required material—whether discussed in class or not—is appropriate for examinations. In other words, although we may not cover all the required materials in class, it may still be on the test!
(b) What does [optional] mean in this class? Readings preceded or followed by [optional] are highly recommended, but you are not required to read them before class. You are, however, responsible for the material to the extent I discuss it in class. If I discuss it in class, it’s fair game for the test.
(c) Additional REQUIRED material can be added to the syllabus at any time. Like the U.S. Constitution, the syllabus can be amended.
(d) The use of AI writing tools (including, but not limited to, ChatGPT, Bard, Sudowrite, etc.) is not permitted in my courses. Students who use these tools for class assignments (such as extra-credit assignments, exam answers, and WordPress comments) undermine the goals and learning objectives of my courses, thereby reducing the effectiveness of my instruction. The TA and I will submit ALL your work to an AI writing detector (e.g., GPTZero) throughout the term. Any confirmed use of AI writing tools will be treated as cheating. Consult page 11 of UIC’s Student Disciplinary Policy, which provides information on Academic Integrity that I will apply to your usage of AI tools. Consider this your only warning.
Section 14 FAQs
(a) What is Extra Credit? Throughout the semester, there are numerous opportunities for extra credit. Obviously, these extra credit opportunities are optional. The Extra Credit guidelines can be found here: Extra Credit Guidelines. Extra Credit assignments must be submitted on the due date. I will no longer accept late extra assignments for partial credit, as previous students have taken advantage of my good nature.
(b) Why are there class numbers, for example, PolS 353, 354, 356, 358, or 359, after required or optional readings? For example, on the PolS 356 syllabus, there is an entry “United States v. Reese 1876 PolS 358, 359.” This means that the case, Reese, is required for PolS 356, but is also included on my other syllabi for PolS 358 and 359. You do not need to take any action regarding PolS 358 or 359. These notations, PolS 358 and 359, are only to demonstrate that the case overlaps in other classes. During my lecture, I might also discuss how Reese relates to these different classes.
Section 15 Weekly Seminar Schedule
Readings under the various topic areas are only suggestive of the vast and growing literature and case law available. These are the readings that I selected for my class this semester. All assigned readings (and cases) must be read before the class session for which they are assigned. Be prepared to review and discuss all assigned cases and readings in class.
WEEK 1
1/13
Post a comment here BEFORE class today
Please post your preferred names and pronouns before Thursday.
ASSIGNMENT: 356 Ice Breaker cartoon (meme). Post a comment before today.
Read the syllabus for PolS 356. Be sure to review all the course requirements.
Review the course requirements again, and then again.
What is a Case Syllabus and/or Headnotes?
Critical Race Theory and Critical Race Feminism. This is an essential document for the class.
1/15
Introductory Comments and Lecture 1
Lecture 1. Introduction to Courts and Law. [PolS 353, 354, 356, 358, 359]
Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie, TED Talk: “We Should All Be Feminists.” Students are required to comment before class today. This reading will be discussed later in the semester.
[optional] Lyles, Barker, et. al. Civil Liberties and the Constitution: Cases and Commentaries (9th edition) CHAPTER 1. Civil Liberties and the Constitution, pp. 1-16. A Framework for Analysis, pp. 1-2; Law and Courts in Political-Social Context, pp. 3-5; Congress, the President, and Administrative Officials, pp. 5-8; Interest Groups and the Dynamics of Civil Liberties, pp. 8-9; More on the Court: Inside the Marble Palace, pp. 9-13; The Rules of the Game and American Political Values, pp. 13-16, Civil Liberties in the Context of Federalism 17-19; The Supreme Court, the Bill of Rights, and the Fourteenth Amendment, pp. 19-23; State Constitutions, pp. 23-26; State Judicial Selection, pp. 26-27; Conclusion, p. 27. [PolS 353, 354, 356, 358, 359]
WEEK 2
1/20
Lecture 2: The Federal Courts: Nature and Structure of the Legal and Political System. [PolS 353, 354, 356, 358, 359]
The Danger of the Single Story. Students are required to comment before class today. This reading will be discussed later in the semester. PolS 358
Martin Shapiro v. Robert Dahl [PolS 353, 354, 356, 358, 359]
Supreme Court Criticism (2023) [PolS 353, 354, 356, 358, 359]
[optional] Dahl, Robert. “Decision-making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker,” Journal of Public Law, vol. 6 (1957). [PolS 353, 354, 356, 358, 359]
[optional] Casper, Jonathon D. “The Supreme Court and National Policy Making,” American Political Science Review 70 (1970): pp. 50-63.
[optional] Barker, Lucius. “Third Parties in Litigation: A Systemic View of the Judicial Function,” Journal of Politics 29 (1967): pp. 41-69.
[optional] Funston, Richard. “The Supreme Court and Critical Elections,” American Political Science Review 69 (1975): pp. 795-811.
[optional] Baum, ch. 4-6
[optional] Lyles, The Gatekeepers: Federal District Courts in the Political Process, ch. 1, 1-9.
[optional] EXTRA CREDIT: Kevin Lyles, The Gatekeepers: Federal District Court in the Political Process, chapter 3, Judicial Selection [PolS 353, 354, 356, 358, 359]
[optional] Lyles, The Bork Confirmation Battle: A Case Study on Judicial Selection, Lyles (1994)
[optional] Amicus Curiae (skim)
[optional] Footnote 4 Stone
1/22¶
Lecture 3: Courts as Policy-making Institutions. [PolS 353, 354, 356, 358, 359]
Leslie Bender, “A Lawyer’s Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort. This reading is REQUIRED for class and can also be critiqued for optional Extra Credit. Your comment is due today, but we will discuss the reading later in the semester.
What “little legitimacy I hold even as a scholar sitting in the same class as many other male peers. Students are required to comment before class today. It will be discussed later in the semester.
Why I Teach PolS 356, and Why You Should Too. Students are required to comment before class today.
[optional] EXTRA CREDIT: Mary Wollstonecraft, “A Vindication of the Rights of Woman.”
[optional] The Constitution of the United States of America [pp. 807-817]
[optional] Alexander Hamilton, et al. The Federalist Papers, No. 78-81
[optional] “Understanding the Federal Courts
How and Why to Brief a Case [PolS 353, 354, 356, 358, 359]
Skim: “A Brief Overview of the Supreme Court” [PolS 353, 354, 356, 358, 359]
WEEK 3
1/27
Last day of introductory lectures. [PolS 353, 354, 356, 358, 359]
Nadine Taub and Elizabeth M. Schneider. This reading is REQUIRED for class and can also be critiqued for Extra Credit. Your comment is due today, but we will discuss the reading later in the semester.
[discuss] Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie, TED Talk, We Should All Be Feminists
[discuss] Danger of the Single Story, PolS 358
[discuss] Leslie Bender, “A Lawyer’s Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort
[discuss] “little legitimacy I hold even as a scholar sitting in the same class as many other male peers
[discuss] Why I Teach PolS 356, and Why You Should Too
[discuss] Nadine Taub and Elizabeth M. Schneider
Why I DON’T Teach PolS 356, and Why You Should Not Either, PART I. Students are required to comment before class today.
Stephanie E. Jones-Rogers. They Were Her Property: White Women as Slave Owners in the American South.
The Constitutional Status of Women in 1787
William Blackstone [skim]
[optional] Education for Black Women PolS 358
[optional] How should men treat their wives
[optional] Seneca Falls
[optional] Frederick Douglass
[optional] Barron v. Baltimore 1833, PolS 353
[optional] Incorporation Doctrine, PolS 354
1/29
Why I DON’T (or should not) teach PolS 356, Part II
Married Women’s Property Act 1848
Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 1842, also 358
Revisit White Women as Avid Slave Owners Stephanie E. Jones-Rogers.
Reclaiming Intimate Histories in the Americas
[optional] Harriet Ann Jacobs 1861
[optional] Women’s Rights, Sojourner Truth, 1867
Thirteenth Amendment also 358
Fourteenth Amendment also 358
Fifteenth Amendment also 358
[optional] Black Women and the Freedman’s Bureau
United States v. Susan B. Anthony, 1873
Butchers’ Benevolent Association v. Crescent City Livestock Landing and Slaughterhouse Co. (The Slaughterhouse Cases) 1873, PolS 358
[optional] Lynching Affect: Irresistible Identification, Sadism, and White Femininity
[optional] EXTRA CREDIT: Sarah and Angelina Grimké, “Letters on the Equality of the Sexes and the Condition of Woman.”
Women and Lynching PolS 358
[optional] Lynching Affect: Irresistible Identification, Sadism, and White Femininity
WEEK 4
2/3
Today is an ASYNCHRONOUS day. We will NOT meet in 209 BH. Watch the pre-recorded lectures (Parts I and II) for Marbury v. Madison and write your first brief—Marbury v. Madison. Everyone should write their first brief AND post something on this page before next week, also 353, 354, 358, and 359.
[optional Extra Credit]The Story of Marbury v Madison, by Michael W. McConnell
Watch “The Supreme Court Visitor’s Film” (C-Span, narrated by A.E. Dick Howard), click here: Supreme Court Visitor’s Film [everyone must post a comment TODAY]
2/5
Today is an ASYNCHRONOUS day. We will NOT meet in 209 BH. Watch the films Iron Jawed Angels and “On the Basis of Sex: Ruth Bader Ginsburg” (2018), directed by Mimi Leder, and comment on this page on BOTH films before Monday. There will be a quiz on these two films next week.
WEEK 5
2/10
[optional] John Stuart Mill
Feminist Jurisprudence (review these three schools of thought for the exams)
Bradwell v. State of Illinois, 1873
Virginia Minor v. Reese Happersett, 1875, PolS 358
United States v. Reese 1876 PolS 358, 359
U.S. v. Cruikshank 1876, PolS 358
[optional] Kevin Lyles, et. al. Civil Liberties and the Constitution: Cases and Commentaries (9th edition), Chapter 2, esp. 19-23 [optional but recommended if you have not taken 354]
[optional] EXTRA CREDIT: “The Subjection of Women” An Essay by John Stuart Mill
2/12
[optional] A Black Feminist Analysis of Bridgerton
[optional] The Higher Education of Women
Baer and Goldstein (4th edition, pp. 49-114)
Lochner v. New York 1905 4 ed. p. 50-
Muller v. Oregon 1908 4 ed. p. 61-
1911 The Lynching of Laura Nelson
1911 Triangle Shirtwaist Factory Fire
Bunting v. Oregon 1917 4 ed. p. 65-
[optional] The Lynching of Mary Turner, PolS 358
[optional], also PolS 358
[optional] Woman Suffrage and the Negro PolS 358
WEEK 6
2/17
Warning: Watch the Movie First before reading this page: Iron Jawed Angels Spoilers
How the Suffrage Movement Betrayed Black Women PolS 358
Adkins v. Children’s Hospital 1923 4 ed. p67-
EXTRA CREDIT: “Black Women and the Right to Vote,” by Darlene Clark Hine and Christine Anne Farnham
Baer and Goldstein, Protecting Women by Limiting Their Freedom, 4th ed., pp. 81-84
Radice v. New York 1924 4 ed. p. 81-
West Coast Hotel Company v. Parrish, 1936 4 ed. p. 84-
[optional] Palko v. Connecticut 1937
Judicial Standards and Equal Protection Review, PolS 358
Baer and Goldstein, The Equal Protection Clause, pp. 46-51 (4th edition pp. 87-98)
Goesaert v. Cleary 1948 4 ed. p. 98-
Baer and Goldstein, The Political Setting, pp. 58-59 (4th edition pp. 111-114)
2/19
[optional] Beyonce-based Course at UIC
EXTRA CREDIT: Memoriam: Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. The editors of the Harvard Law Review offer this collection of tributes to Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg.
[optional] A Black Feminist Analysis of Bridgerton
EXTRA CREDIT: Ida B. Wells: A Passion for Justice The Pioneering African American Journalist & Activist
WEEK 7
2/24
Hooray for Hootie REVISED: MIKE PENCE’S REFUSAL TO EAT ALONE WITH WOMEN
Watch the 2014 film Selma (Directed by Ava DuVernay) before next week. PolS 358
“India’s Daughter” New Extra Credit Opportunity
2/26
Conservatives and Progressives Debate Feminism
[optional] The U.S. Military’s Legacy in the Philippines: Thousands of Children Left Behind
[optional] EXTRA CREDIT: “The Politics of Black Feminist Thought” by Patricia Hill Collins
WEEK 8
3/3
Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 1979
Title VII also PolS 358
Baer and Goldstein, pp. 139-142
NEW After class quiz, Tuesday March 10, 2026.
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The Burger Court and Sex Discrimination
Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp, 1971, PolS 358
[optional] Griggs v. Duke Power Company 1971, PolS 358
[optional] Corning Glass Works v. Brennan 1974
Equality v Equity also PolS 358
Extra Credit: After watching the 2014 film Selma (Directed by Ava DuVernay), and the film Iron Jawed Angels, post a brief comment here comparing aspects of the two films. Be sure to focus on intersectionality. In addition to your comment on WordPress, submit your 2-3 page paper (double-spaced) directly to me at lyles@uic.edu by the end of the week.
3/5
[optional] Washington v. Davis 1976 PolS 358
[optional] Los Angeles Department of Water and Power v. Manhart 1978
[optional] Arizona Governing Committee v. Norris 1983
[optional] County of Washington v. Gunther 1981
[optional Extra Credit] “Miss Representation”
Women, Gender, and Affirmative Action [take PolS 358]
This is a list of cases covering the policy of “affirmative action.” Although some of these cases deal directly with “women and affirmative action,” most of the cases are covered in PolS 358 and are [optional] for this class, PolS 356. You are responsible for these options cases only to the extent they are discussed in class.
[optional] [repeat] Griggs v. Duke Power Company 1971
[optional] [repeat] Washington v. Davis 1976
[optional] Regents of the University of California v. Bakke 1978 PolS 358
[optional] Johnson v. Transportation Agency 1987 PolS 358
[optional] Wendy Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education 1986, PolS 358
[optional] Notes from Ronald J. Fiscus, PolS 358
[optional] “Bush-style” affirmative action PolS 358
QUIZ: John Doe v. New Horizons Women’s Shelter
WEEK 9
3-10
Required: Before March 26, watch Greta Gerwig’s Barbie movie. Although it may appear to be a lighthearted movie about the famous Barbie doll on the surface, it is much more complex, exploring themes of feminism, female empowerment, intersectionality, and more. There will be a required QUIZ on the Barbie movie in the future.
Baer and Goldstein, Women and Education, pp. 498-500
Mississippi University for Women et al. v. Hogan, 1982
Title IX, Education Amendments of 1972
Grove City College v. Bell, 1984
Making Partner: Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins 1989
[optional] Patterson v McLean Credit Union 1989, PolS 358
Baer and Goldstein, The Civil Rights Act of 1991
Title IX
UIC Invites Daughters to Work for a Day
Title IX: Leveling the Playing Field
3/12
United States v. Virginia, 1996
[optional] Extra Credit: The Intersection of Racial and Gender Bias PolS 358
[optional] Lyles’ summaries before and after the midterm. This is an optional reading that you might find helpful in condensing some of the material.
Nothing below this line will be covered on Exam #1.
WEEK 10
3-17
Baer and Goldstein, Women and Reproductive Freedom, pp. 343-345
Baer and Goldstein, “Contraception and the Right to Privacy,” p. 352
The Catholic Church and Contraception
Griswold et al. v. Connecticut 1965
Asked to resign from her job in 1929
Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 1974
General Electric Company v. Martha Gilbert, 1976
Nashville Gas Company v. Satty 1977
The Pregnancy Discrimination Act
Newport Shipbuilding and Drydock v. EEOC 1983
[optional] California Federal Savings and Loan v. Guerra, 1987
[optional] Wimberly v. Labor and Industrial Relations Comm 1987
UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc. 1991
The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 FMLA
[optional] Recent FMLA lower Ct ruling (2023)
[optional] Nevada v. Hibbs 2003
Critical Race Feminism assignments are due before April 18, 11:59 PM.
3-19
*********** EXAM #1 **************
WEEK 11 SPRING BREAK, (MARCH 24-28)
WEEK 12
3/31
There will be a required QUIZ on the Barbie movie at the start of class TODAY.
EXTRA CREDIT: Lucinda M. Finley. “The Story of Roe v. Wade [optional]
Baer and Goldstein, “Legalizing Abortion,” pp. 369-370
[optional] Transcript Roe v Wade
[optional] Doe v Bolton 1973
[optional] Planned Parenthood v. Danforth 1976
[optional] Frank Beal et al. v. Ann Doe 1977
[optional] Edward Maher v. Susan Roe 1977
[optional] Poelker et al. v. Jane Doe 1977
[optional] Baer and Goldstein, Refinements of the Framework, 1979-1989
[optional] Harris v. Cora McRae 1980
[optional] Planned Parenthood, etc.
[optional] Akron v. Akron CRH 1983
[optional] Thornburgh v. ACOG 1986
[optional] Webster v. RHS 1989
[optional] Rust v. Sullivan 1991
[optional] Planned Parenthood v. Casey 1992
Shifting Judicial Consensus, 1989-1991
[optional] Schenck v. Pro-Choice 1997 PolS 354
[optional] lyles partial birth abortion
EXTRA CREDIT: “Should Abortion Be Restricted: Robert Bork vs. Mary Gordon?”
[optional] Optional/FYI: 2014 [2019] National Clinic Violence Survey
4/2
Burwell v Hobby Lobby 2014 PolS 354
[optional] Feminism Inshallah: A History of Arab Feminism
Tracking the States Where Abortion is Now Banned
[optional] The Dobbs Decision Could Erode Other Women’s Rights–Making the ERA More Important Than Ever
Abortions Rose in Most States This Year, New Data Shows [9-7-23]
They’re Coming for Birth Control (post before class today)
Lepage v. Center for Reproductive Medicine, 2024
NEW added 4/8/2026. Women Who Died After Being Denied Abortion Care
WEEK 13
4-7
Baer and Goldstein, Feminists Divide Over Pornography, 3rd ed. pp. 609-615; 4th edition 1135-1138 [required]
[optional] Regina v. Hicklin 1868 PolS 354
[optional] Roth v. United States 1957 PolS 354
[optional] Jacobellis v. Ohio 1964 PolS 354
[optional] Memoirs v. Massachusetts 1966 PolS 354
Miller v. California 1973 PolS 354
[optional] Barnes v. Glen Theatre 1991 PolS 354
Barker vs Dworkin Should Pornography Be Protected by the First Amendment?
[optional] Extra Credit: Kelly Cronin (former student, 2008). “Responsible Pornography: Respecting Women’s Interests and Rights in the Industry.” DePaul Journal of Women, Gender, and the Law. Vol 2
The Laws That Sex Workers Really Want
4-9
NEW Extra Credit: Emma Morales, “A Feminist Lens: The Big Beautiful Bill’s Effect on SNAP Recipients
Privacy, Sexual Orientation, Gender, Race, and Marriage
[optional] Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston (515 U.S. 557, 1995)
Boy Scouts v. Dale, 2000, PolS 354
[optional, 2026] Chiles v. Salazar, 2026
Black Feminism and Self-Possession
WEEK 14
4/14
Gender and Family Law.
The Traditional Family and the Wife as Husband’s Property: Tinker v. Colwell 1904
A Married Woman’s Surname: Rago and Palermo Cases
Asymmetrical Reciprocity: McGuire v. McGuire (1953) and Borelli v. Brousseau (1993)
Loving v. Virginia 1967 also PolS 358
[optional] Extra Credit: The Loving Story
The United States Supreme Court Changes the Definition of Marriage
maps on same-sex marriage [outdated]
[optional] United States v. Windsor 2013
[optional] Hollingsworth v. Perry 2013
Revisit: Stanton v. Stanton 1975
Revisit: Orr v. Orr 1979
[optional extra-credit] The constitutionality of bans on conversion practices and saving transgender lives. “Made to Feel Broken…” A book review in the Harvard Law Review of a recent publication on LGBT rights
4/16
WARNING: The readings below include descriptions of rape and sexual assault and could impact the well-being and academic performance of some students. These readings and “state cases” are REQUIRED for the final exam but will be discussed only briefly during class. pp. 1099-1135.
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 1986
The Mechelle Vinson case by Augustus B. Cochran, Sexual Harassment and the Law, 2004
EEOC Sexual Harassment Guidelines
UIC: Prohibiting Sexual Harassment
Workplace-Related Intimate Relationships at UIC
[optional] Gebser v. Lago Vista 1998
[optional] Jones v. Clinton 1998 PolS 353]
[optional] Davis v. Monroe, 1999
Sexual assault does not disqualify one from being the leader of the free world?
https://www.aaup.org/news/brief-workplace-discrimination-based-lgbtq-status-unlawful#.XT7471B7lUM
[optional] More Black Women Run for Office, but Prospects Fade the Higher They Go
WEEK 15
4-21
REQUIRED BEFORE COMING TO CLASS TODAY, YOU MUST READ “THE TROUBLE TEACHING RAPE LAW” The Trouble Teaching Rape Law
Final Exam, Part 1: Harassment Prompt. This is part of your FINAL Exam. Reply BEFORE 9:30 p.m. on April 20.
[optional extra-credit] Killing Us Softly
Baer and Goldstein, “Rape” Camille Paglia and Susan Estrich, pp.1099-1104
Emily Doe, Victim Impact Statement in People of the State of Cal. v. Brock Turner, p. 1102-1104
Force and Consent: Randy J. Goldberg v. State of Maryland pp. 1104-1112
Resistance: State v. Rusk (1981) pp. 1112-1120
Resistance (revised): In the Interest of M.T.S. (1992) pp. 1120-1133
Schulhofer, Unwanted Sex: The Culture of Intimidation and Failure of Law, pp. 1132-1133
Marital Rape Lisa Eskow and Kelly Connerton pp. 1133-1135
Statutory Rape: Michael M. v. Sup Court of Sonoma 1981
[optional] Patrick Kennedy v. Louisiana 2008
[optional] EXTRA CREDIT: Frances Olsen, “Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis
United States v. Morrison 2000 skim, PolS 353
Justice Souter’s dissent in Morrison
[optional] Girls & Sex’ And the Importance of Talking to Young Women About Pleasure
Lyles, The Gatekeepers: ch. 9, “Does Gender Make a Difference?”
[optional] Jericho Bernal’s Gatekeepers Analysis
ASSIGNMENT: Icebreaker cartoon (meme). Comment before class today. You have been here before, and I want you to “reply” to your previous comment. Is there anything you would like to add or retract after 15 weeks of PolS 356?
WEEK 15
4-21
U.S. Rape Culture is Sidelining and Silencing Future Female Leaders
[optional] It Was Easier to Give In Than to Keep Running
[optional] Why Did Police Departments Throw Out Rape Kits?
Legalized rape is a constitutional thing…
Violence Against Women–TED video
Black Women’s Resistance to Sexual Violence
“Girls,” Season 6, Episode 3, “American Bitch” First aired February 26, 2017
4/23
[optional] L. Ha00 nna, CCDOC
Rape laws, rape culture, and intersectionality
Introduction to Jury Trials [lecture notes from PowerPoint Slides]
[optional] Strauder v. West Virginia 1880, PolS 358
Swain v. Alabama, 1965, PolS 358
[optional] Billy Taylor v. Louisiana 1975
[optional] Batson v. Kentucky 1986 PolS 358
EXTRA CREDIT: Data on Gender, Rape, and Sexual Violence in the United States
Social Media and Teenage Girls
Sexual Assault Accusers Can Be Sued for Defamation
Final Exam, Part 2. Student-Generated Questions for PolS 356
WEEK 16
4/28
Privacy and Poverty
[optional] The Perception Paradox: Men Who Hate Feminists Think Feminists Hate Men
[optional] EXTRA CREDIT: bell hooks, Feminist Theory: From Margin to Center, chapter one, “Black Women Shaping Feminist Theory.”
Latinas Have Struggled to Build Savings
National Women’s Law Center: Women and Poverty [skim]
Wealth and Women of Color in America [skim]
Baer and Goldstein, Chapter 8, “Conclusions,” pp. 1199-1203
[optional] Lyles’ summaries before and after the midterm. This is an optional reading that you might find helpful in condensing some of the material.
[optional] Women of Color and the Neoliberal University: An Interview with Lorgia Garcia
Pena Pt. 1 The reading might be of special interest to women of color (and their allies) considering graduate school.
Thursday, April 30 (The Last Day of Class)
PolS 356 students: Are You Graduating? Going to Law School, Grad School, or Looking for a Job in Another State?
Final Exam, Part 3 is
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Wed May 6 |
10:30 – 12:30 pm |
2BH |
209 |
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